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In this chapter, emotions are not regarded primarily as internal-psychological 
phenomena, but as socially proscribed and formed entities, which are constituted 
in accordance with social rules of emotionality and which are manifested, 
interpreted, and processed together communicatively in the interaction for definite 
purposes by the persons involved. In the elaboration of such an interactive 
conception of  emotionality, the following aspects are treated: the value of 
emotionality in linguistic theories; emotions as a specific form of experiencing; 
the rules of emotionality; communication of emotions as transmission of 
evaluations; practices of manifestation, interpretation and processing of emotions 
in the communication process; fundamental interrelations between emotions and 
communication behavior; and methodology of the analysis of emotions and 
emotionality in specific conversation types. Finally, the developed theoretical 
apparatus in the analysis of two short conversation sections is elucidated.
EMOTIONALITY IN LINGUISTIC THEORIES
It is a common conception that people’s experiences and feelings influence and 
occasionally even determine their communicative behavior and the course of 
conversations. Utterances like His voice was raised in anger or It was no longer a 
reasonable discussion. The two only poisoned each other express this concept. 
Linguists, however, have difficulties handling the connections between 
emotionality and conversational behavior, and more generally, the interrelations 
between emotions and language. In many linguistic and communication theories, 
emotionality has no role or no systematic value (e.g, theory of signs, grammar 
theory, speech act theory, conversational analysis, etc.). Although there have 
been a series of attempts to develop these theories to include emotionality (e.g., 
for the theory of signs by the connotation concept, for the speech act theory by
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the explication of the category “expressive speech act” [cf. Marten-Cleef, 1991]), 
these theories at their core and in their fundamental assumptions do not provide 
for emotionality.
If the interrelations between emotions and language or communication is 
taken as the explicit subject of investigation, this very frequently happens on a 
theoretical level, because a fundamental requirement for clarification exists, (e.g., 
Bamberg, 1997; Battacchi, Suslow, & Renna 1996; Fries, 1996; 
Konstantinidou, 1997) and/or on a programmatic level (e.g., Caffi & Janney, 
1994; Dane, 1987; Herrmann, 1987,) without reference to empirical data. The 
range of questions and methods in these studies is too broadly scattered and 
heterogeneous to be covered here (cf. the literature surveys of Fiehler, 1990a, 
paragraph 2.1 and Dreschcr, 1997, chap. 2). The views regarding emotions in 
these studies are strongly influenced by theoretical concepts prevalent in the 
disciplines “responsible” for emotions like anthropology, philosophy, 
sociology, and especially psychology (for a newer overview of emotion theories 
in these disciplines cf. Cornelius, 1996).
When an empirical approach to the interrelations between emotions and 
language or communication is taken, the studies tend to be experimental 
investigations in which test subjects are presented with emotional language 
content in predefined situations or asked to produce it as a result of a controlled 
inducing of emotion (Fries, 1991; Tischer, 1993, gives an overview of 
appropriate investigations in chap. 3). Even when the degree of situation 
definition and the restriction of the courses of action for the study participants are 
manipulated to differing intensities according to the directions of the experiment, 
so that as one pole conversations—induced and performed by instruction—seem 
to result (e.g., Thimm & Kruse, 1993), nevertheless all these linguistic data are 
produced for the purpose of their investigation.
Although the literature regarding the connections between emotions and 
communication/language has achieved a significant scope and an amazing 
diversification, only a few works have taken emotions in everyday 
communication as their subject and empirically investigated the manifestation, 
interpretation, and processing of emotions in interaction using natural 
conversations.
Emotions are a thorny scientific subject for two primary reasons: First, 
science is dominated by conceptualizations of humans as primarily purposeful, 
rational beings. This conceptualization is prevalent in the most diverse 
disciplines and theories—beginning in theories of action, moving to 
interactional theories and right up to cognitive linguistics. Accordingly, 
scientific theories have likewise tended to regard communication and 
conversation as cognitively determined, purposeful, rational, and instrumental. 
Second, the prevailing conceptualization of emotions as internal-psychological 
phenomena makes their linguistic handling difficult.
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Increasing demands for both predictability and reliability lead emotionality to 
appear increasingly socially dysfunctional and lead to an accordingly negative 
valuation of emotions (Elias, 1981). A picture of the human being emerges from 
these demands—surely far from the actual state of affairs— in which people are 
conceived as purposeful, rationally behaving, thoughtful beings—in their 
communicative and conversational behavior as well. The postulate of isolated 
linguistic signs in semiotic theory, the separation of denotation and connotation, 
as well as the reduction of the communication process to information exchange 
by means of the denotative component of signs, are milestones on the way to 
theories conceptualizing language and communication without consideration of 
emotionality. This cognitive and purposeful-rational orientation is recognizable 
from the central positions of the concepts of “goal” and “purpose” in theories of 
verbal acting (speech act theory, discourse analysis) and in the limitation of 
modeling to exclusively cognitive processes. Another example is conversational 
analysis. Its strict orientation toward the “communicative surface” prevents the 
explicit consideration of internal psychological processes such as intentions, 
cognitions, and emotions. As a result, emotions cannot be integrated 
systematically into theoretical formulations. Even if they are not eliminated 
completely, emotions can only be included as “a leftover category of the 
linguistic view of language” (Ehlich, 1986, p. 319).
On the other hand, it is precisely the common understanding that emotions 
are primarily internal-psychological phenomena that makes their linguistic and 
conversation-analytic handling so difficult. In contrast, my assumption here is 
that emotionality has its place in interaction: Only during processes of 
manifestation, interpretation, and processing of emotions can they be grasped 
through linguistics and conversational analysis.
Thus one can be interested in emotions from two different perspectives: 
First, emotions can be examined in the context of the personal system. They are 
then understood as elements of personal interior life. From this perspective, one 
can ask, for example, what relationship emotions have to other elements of 
interior life (e.g., cognitions, motivations, dispositions) and how they come to 
expression. This is the prevailing everyday point of view as well as the scientific 
perspective.
On the other hand, emotions can be examined as public phenomena in social 
situations o f  interpersonal interaction. From this perspective, one can examine 
the function and value of emotional manifestations in interaction, independent of 
whether the participants also actually feel the manifested emotions. The focus 
from this perspective is on how emotions are manifested, mutually interpreted, 
and processed during interaction, and on the practices participants use to 
manifest, interpret, and process emotions. This perspective considers emotions 
primarily as elements of interaction and emphasizes their functionality for 
interaction. At the same time, it regards emotions as socially regulated
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phenomena and stresses their social figuration. “Such a conceptualization focused 
on the social and particularly the discursive reality of the feelings is, in my 
opinion, the only one, that opens the problematics for linguistic questions at 
all” (Drescher, 1997, p. 112).
EMOTIONS AND EXPERIENCE
People experience a multiplicity of internal-psychological processes and states 
in everyday life, not all of which they would define as “emotions.” For example, 
one can be strained, surprised, curious, fascinated, and so forth. Experience and 
action are the two central strands of the personal-environmental reference. 
Experiencing is a totalizing mode, in which people experience themselves in 
their relationships with the environment and with themselves. Experiencing 
results from actions, accompanies actions, and leads to actions.
Emotions and feelings—which are used here interchangeably —are specific 
forms of experiencing. One can experience annoyance, disgust, and joy, which 
represent prototypical emotions. But one can also experience irritation, 
uncertainty, curiosity, tiredness, and hunger, which are not emotions or at least 
not “pure” emotions. For example, certain cognitive processes play a substantial 
role in feelings of uncertainty, and physical conditions play a role in feelings of 
tiredness and hunger. In addition, emotions can be dominant in the experiential 
process, but they can occur also in various combinations and mixtures with 
other forms of experience —and this is probably the rule.
RULES OF EMOTIONALITY
The social basis of emotions becomes particularly clear when we consider the 
rules of emotionality; rules that determine, to a great extent, how people feel, 
manifest, and process emotions (Hochschild, 1979). Four types of rules of 
emotionality can be distinguished, each of which regulate the occurrence of 
emotion at different levels and within different areas: emotion rules, 
manifestation rules, correspondence rules and coding rules.
Emotion rules indicate the type and intensity of feelings viewed as 
appropriate and socially acceptable within a given type of situation, from the 
perspectives of both the person concerned and the other participants. As Scherer, 
Summerfield, and Wallbott (1983) observed, “There seem to be relatively clear 
cultural expectations as to how appropriate particular emotions and particular
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intensities of emotion are in particular situations” (pp. 360-361). Coulter (1979) 
similarly noted that, ‘Types of situations are paradigmatically linked to the 
emotion they afford by convention. The link is neither deterministic nor 
biological, but socio-cultural” (p. 133). The general form  of emotion rules can 
be stated as follows:
If a situation is interpreted as type X,
it is appropriate and is socially expected,
to have an emotional experience of the type Y.
For example, if a situation is interpreted to involve an irreparable loss, then 
sadness is appropriate and socially expected. If I am in such a situation in which 
there has been an irreparable loss, I expect to feel sadness, and on the basis of 
this emotion rule, my interaction partner expects that I will feel this way and 
interprets my behavior in this light.
Manifestation rules regulate the type and intensity of emotions that may be 
expressed in a particular situation, regardless of what emotion one is actually 
feeling. For example, if a boy’s dog is run over he might cry. The expression, 
big boys don't cry. codifies a manifestation rule that specifies that when men are 
sad, it is appropriate and socially expected that they will not display their 
feelings of sadness by crying.
Correspondence rules regulate the types of emotions and manifestations 
expected from conversational partners in response to a person’s feelings or 
displays of particular emotions. If, for example, I see that my conversational 
partner is sad, I should not continue to feel relaxed and merry, at least I should 
not show it.
Coding rules are conventions that describe and determine which behaviors 
count as manifestations of an emotion. Thus they pertain to both the behaviors 
by which a feeling can be manifested and to the indicators in a person’s 
behaviors that enable interactional partners to recognize that he or she is 
experiencing an emotion.
In essence, in this model of a system of emotionality rules, not only are the 
expression or manifestation behaviors subject to social standards and 
conventions, but there are also rules for the emotions themselves toward which 
those participating in the interaction orient themselves. If an individual 
experience deviates from the rules, an individual or interactive tuning between 
emotional requirements and individual emotions can take place via emotion 
regulation (Fiehler, 1990a, pp. 87-93). The system of emotionality rules is 
socially diverse: The rules vary specifically according to roles, gender, situation, 
and (sub)culture. The rules of emotionality are thus not by any means universal.
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COMMUNICATION OF EMOTIONS AS 
TRANSMISSION OF EVALUATIONS
Interaction can be understood as a complex hierarchy of tasks that must be 
fulfilled to achieve certain goals and purposes. Processes of evaluation and 
statement always play a role in the solution of these tasks. These evaluations 
and statements are likewise to be understood as tasks to be solved either 
individually or interactively. A number of procedures are available to participants 
for solving the tasks of evaluation. What we commonly call emotions or 
emotional processes can be understood as a specific procedure for the solution of 
such tasks of evaluation and statement. Differently formulated: A part of these 
evaluation tasks is solved on the emotional level.
From a functional perspective, each emotion can be described as an 
evaluating statement. The following schema can clarify this:
Emotion A is an evaluating statement 
about X
on the basis of Y 
as Z.
Table 4.1 shows the allocations that are possible for X, Y, and Z:
TABLE 4.1
Emotions as Evaluating Statements
About X On the basis of Y As Z
(1) Situation (1) Expectations (1) In agreement
(2) Other person 
Action
Characteristics
(2) Interests, desires (2) Not in agreement
(3) One’s Self 
Action
Characteristics
(3) Social norms and morals
(4) Events and circumstances (4) Self-concept
(5) Articles
(6) Mental productions
(5) Picture of the other one
For example, if I am annoyed at myself because I have knocked over a vase, this 
can be understood as an evaluating statement about oneself (or an action one has 
performed) on the basis of one’s self-concept (or expectations over my behavior) 
as not in agreement. If I am pleased with the thought that I will receive a visit 
tomorrow, then this can be described as an evaluating statement about a mental 
production on the basis of my desires (or expectations) as in agreement.
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If an emotion is communicated in the interaction, this is equivalent to 
communication of an evaluating statement or, more generally, an evaluation. If 
the emotion “disgust” is expressed through behaviors (e.g., mimicry, shuddering, 
vocal characteristics) or by words (e.g., /  am disgusted by this meal), then a 
specific negative evaluation—here, of the meal—is communicated to the 
interlocutor. This same evaluation could, of course, also be conveyed in ways 
other than by communication of an emotion (e.g., by evaluation descriptors or 
formulations: Terrible! or I find the meal repulsive, etc.).
In order to determine the value of emotional communication for interaction, 
communication must be understood as multidimensional—as more than just the 
exchange of information by signs. One must assume instead that communication 
always has at least two aspects of equal standing: the communication of 
circumstances and the communication of evaluations. Evaluations are always 
communicated as part of any exchange on any topic. Some of this evaluative 
content is communicated via emotions.
This fundamental evaluative dimension of utterances has been systematically 
neglected in linguistic conceptions of communication in favor of the information 
dimension. But the systematic value of emotional communication can only 
become clear as special form o f communication o f evaluations when both the 
evaluative and informative dimensions of communication are taken into account.
COMMUNICATION OF EMOTIONS IN THE INTERACTION
With respect to emotions in interaction, participants solve specific 
communication tasks by means of specific communicative practices. Three broad 
classes of communication tasks can be distinguished: the manifestation o f 
emotions, the interpretation o f emotions, and the interactive processing o f  
emotions.
During the course of an interaction, emotions can be manifested and 
communicated to partners through various patterns of behaviors and utterances 
(especially phenomena of emotional expression and verbal thematizations of 
emotions), independent of whether the emotions are actually present or not.
In particular, if experience was displayed in an interaction-relevant manner, 
but also independently of this, the emotional presence is interpreted in 
interaction situations more or less intensively mutually. This emotion task does 
not necessarily require communication tasks. An interpretation may be made 
privately, but the results of this interpretation can become relevant to the 
interaction. An interpretation may also involve communicative sequences in the 
form of questions (e.g., Are you angry?), projective experience thematization 
(e.g., Don’t be so sad), or negotiations.
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Once an experience or an emotion has been established as an interactive 
“fact” through manifestation and interpretation, it can be processed 
communicatively. Strategies for processing emotions include “entering,” 
“analyzing,” “calling into question,” and “ignoring.”
Manifestation of Experiencing and Emotions
People can use two different strategies to communicate emotions and 
experiences: They can give them expression in different ways or they can make 
them the explicit topic or subject of the interaction. Thus, we can distinguish 
between practices for the expression of experiences and emotions and practices 
for the thematization of experiences and emotions.
In thematization, an experience or an emotion is made the topic of the 
interaction by a verbalization. Expression, however, is not limited to 
verbalization (although expressions may naturally accompany verbalizations). 
Emotional expressions also do not necessarily make experiences although they 
are manifested as the topic of the interaction. A splenetic Can you perhaps be on 
lime sometime? certainly expresses an emotion by means of speech rate, 
intonation contour, vocal characteristics, and so forth. However, it does not 
thematize the experience, as would be the case with Your perpetual lateness 
really annoys me! In the latter example, emotional experience is explicitly made 
the topic of verbal communication, allowing people to communicate about 
emotions. This is the essential structure of thematization of emotions and 
experiences.
Most often, however, the topic of verbal communication will be something 
other than emotion, butbesides and at the same time people communicate 
emotions by the manner in which they communicate about the topic. The 
emotions function as evaluating statements with respect to the topic, as well as 
with respect to further aspects: to other persons, their actions, ourselves, and so 
on. This is the essential structure of the expression of emotions and experience.
Expression
The communication of emotions consists to a high degree of expressions of 
emotions and the interpretation of these expressions. Emotional expression, as it 
happens at a certain place in the interaction, is a function of underlying emotions 
on the one hand and, on the other hand, of display rules specifying what 
expressions are socially appropriate and expected In ~ given situation. Emotional 
expression is thus understood as not exclusively a consequence of internal 
emotions (this is the usual view), but as determined equally from internal 
emotions and manifestation rules.
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By emotional expression I mean all behaviors (and involuntary physiological 
reactions) in the context of an interaction that are manifested by a participant 
with the awareness that they are related to emotions and/or that are perceived and 
interpreted by the interaction partner accordingly. In this way, emotion 
expression is conceptualized from the outset in terms of its communicative 
function within interaction.
The relationship between expression and emotion can be determined on the 
following basis: In specific situations, specific behaviors and physiological 
reactions of individuals or groups are understood by other individuals or groups 
as the expression of a certain emotion of a certain intensity. These expressions 
may or may not actually express such an emotion. For this determination, the 
following considerations are relevant:
• Emotion expression, or that which is considered as such, can vary by 
situation and by person or group.
• Interacting persons do not always interpret emotion expression as a sign 
of “real” emotions.
• Emotion expression has a conventional aspect.
• Emotion expression is a complex phenomenon, usually consisting of 
more than one behavior or physiological reaction.
• Any behaviors and physiological reactions can be interpreted by a 
recipient as emotion expression— independent of how the acting person 
understands these behaviors and reactions.
Thematization
We can distinguish at least four practices in the thematization of experiences 
and emotions: (a) verbal labeling of experiences and emotions, (b) description of 
experiences and emotions, (c) designation or description of the events and 
circumstances relevant to the experience and (d) description or narration of the 
situational circumstances of an experience.
Verbal labeling o f Experiences and Emotions. Emotions can be thematized 
by verbal experience labels. Terms for emotions are socially preformed 
interpretative possibilities for personal experiences; they are socially standardized 
possibilities of typing and of defining an experience. The whole of these 
designations forms the emotion vocabulary or lexicon of a language. Emotion 
terms exist at both the general (feeling, mood, experiencing) and specific (fear, 
joy, fascination) levels. They are present in nominal, verbal, and adjectival form. 
The emotion vocabulary cannot be clearly delimited, due to the fact that most 
expressions we use for internal states also have cognitive, evaluating, 
motivational, and physiological components of meaning, with which they can 
become relevant in communication (Fiehler, 1990c).
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Descriptions o f Experiences and. Emotions. Descriptions of experiences and 
emotions are more or less detailed attempts to clarify a specific experience to the 
interaction partner by rewritings. Important linguistic means for the 
implementation of descriptions of experience include, among other things, the 
use of (a) experiential declarative formulas, (b) frozen metaphorical idioms 
(phraseologies), and (c) the metaphorical use of expressions:
Experiential declarative formulas are expressions that define what occurs in 
their scope as experience or emotion. Examples of these expressions include: 1 
felt (myself) X; I liad the feeling X; to me, it was X, and so on. The scope of 
these formulas can include experience-designating terms (/ felt 
anxious/depressed/happy/etc.), short comparisons (Ifelt empty/put upon/etc.) and 
comparisons or images using like or as i f  (I felt like the sun king/as i f  the earth 
had slid away under my feet/etc.). Frozen metaphorical idioms are conventional 
figurative-metaphorical expressions for emotions or experiences, such as: Es 
kocht in mir (it boils within me); Das haut mich aus den Schuhen (that knocks 
my socks off); Du treibst mich auf die Palme (you are driving me nuts), and so 
on. Metaphorical use o f expressions refers to other, nonconventional figurative 
uses of expressions to describe an emotion or experiences, such as:: Ich hänge 
durch (I am sagging); Die Prüfung steht mir bevor (my exam is impending); Ich 
war völlig zu (I was completely blocked) and so on.
If one analyzes the full range of figurative language used to describe 
experience (experience-declarative formulas with short and developed 
comparisons, fixed metaphorical idioms, metaphorical use of expressions, etc.), 
one can derive fundamental everyday conceptualizations of emotions which 
structure and determine our understanding of emotions and their functioning 
(Kiivecscs, 1990). Except by labels, experience and emotions can hardly be 
talked about except by representing them in analogy to other (more concrete) 
areas (Lakoff &Johnson, 1980). Frequently these are not single analogies, but 
rather, certain domains are the source for a multiplicity of figurative descriptions 
of experience. I briefly mention some substantial and productive domains.
Negative experience is frequently conceptualized as PHYSICAL 
VIOLATION or disturbance of the physical integrity (something hurt me 
terribly, left a wound, scars, gnaws at me, I shred myself, something hits me 
like a shot to the heart, or goes under the skin). Furthermore emotions are 
conceptualized as SENSORY PERCEPTION (that left a bad taste in my mouth, 
stinks, I can't stand the smell, it doesn’t scratch my itch). Further concepts are 
HEAT and COLDNESS (that left me cold, it boils within me), the pressure 
rising to the explosion (it tore my heart, I exploded) and taking o ff from the 
ground (who will fly  up in the air). Close relationships exist between these 
concepts, and they spill over into concepts used to describe emotional dynamics: 
RISING AND FALLING OF WATER (a feeling o f fear flooded over/through
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me, then it ebbed), INFLAMING AND BURNING, as well as WIND AND 
STORM.
Positive feelings are conceptualized as, among other things, DECREASE IN 
WEIGHT, which makes it possible to float or fly (it took a load off my mind, 
what a relief, I floated as on clouds, fe lt like I was in seventh heaven). This is a 
special case of conceptualizations that use the dimension lieight/depth, whereby 
positively evaluated feelings are high, and negatively evaluated are deep (/ am 
down, torn down to the ground). The investigation of which conceptualizations 
are the basis of the descriptions of emotions, how they are connected with more 
general conceptualization practices and which mixtures or overlays of metaphoric 
domains are possible, results in a most interesting way of explaining the 
everyday understanding of emotions.
Labeling/Describing Events and Circumstances Relevant to an Experience. 
By labeling or describing events or circumstances that have clearly negative or 
positive consequences for the speaker, experience connected with these events can 
be made the topic of the interaction. This is particularly true if the utterances are 
accompanied by appropriate expression phenomena, for example. My dog was 
run over yesterday! (with appropriate mimicry and intonation).
Description/Narration o f the Situational Circumstances o f an Experience. 
One’s own or other’s past experiences can be thematized, as the situational 
circumstances or the flow of the events are described, reported, or told. They are 
reported or told, in order to clarify an experience in the situation concerned. The 
aim of such reports or narrations in experience-thematizing intention is to have 
the listener call the narrated situation to mind and, resorting to the emotion rules 
valid for this type of situation, grasp how the other one felt in that situation. 
The description of the situational circumstances and order of events can thereby 
consist exclusively of the playback of actions and cognitions of the persons 
involved in the situation concerned. In more complex experience thematizations, 
verbal designations and descriptions of the experience may be used in addition to 
descriptions of the situational circumstances. I speak of a complex experience 
thematization, if the speaker uses more than one of the practices I have specified 
for thematizing a particular experience.
Elements in Thematizations of Experiences and 
Emotions
The thematization of an emotion can focus on different aspects of the 
experience, including:
1. the carrier of experience: P
2. the type of experience: E (for unspecified experience), A (for a specific 
emotion)
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3. the intensity of experience: I
4. the dynamics or process of experience: D
5. the object or point of reference of experience: O
6. the bases of experience and the yardsticks of the evaluating statement: G
One can easily recognize in these aspects the definition given above that 
experience / emotion E is an evaluating statement (specific according to type A, 
intensity / and dynamic/process D) of a person P to something O with the 
statement grounded on a specific basis G. However, thematization can also be 
determined by a number of further aspects:
7. the initiator or the reason of the experience: V
8. the localization of experience in the body: K
9. the appearance of expression and somatic-physiological effects of the
experience: AUS
10. the consequences of the experience: F
With the help of these aspects of focusing, we can completely analyze all 
utterances that thematize an experience on the basis of the practices of verbal 
labeling or description. First the analysis of two examples of verbally labeling 
experience thematizations:
A. “ I was in complete despair.”v v v
P 1 A
B. “Me had a disgusting lecling in his gut because of the discussion."
V S-JV' V  v----Y---->
P A E K O
Now three examples of the analysis of experience descriptions:
C. “You are gradually getting on my nerves.”
V V  V
V D P
E, K or AUS
D. “It boils inside me.”VVSH
EIAUS K P
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E. “That was a considerable shot to the kidneys.”
O 1 D K
E
A single experience-thematizing utterance does not need to focus on every 
aspect mentioned, but it will contain only these aspects. Many different 
combinations of aspects can be focused, and with different weights and different 
levels of precision.
Experience thematization can be produced with a large variety of figurative 
expressions as was demonstrated earlier and as the examples again show. These 
figurative thematizations of experience can also be analyzed with the help of the 
ten aspects of focusing specified previously. Figurative expressions (in the 
context of experience thematization) are always interpreted as the focusing of a 
specific aspect or a combination of these aspects. The fact that the figurativeness 
always refers to this relatively small number of aspects protects its 
comprehensibility, on the one hand, and makes its variety possible, on the other 
hand.
Manifestation Areas
Interacting individuals manifest their experiences and emotions— whether by 
expression and/or by thematization—within every area of their behavior. The 
manifestations can be assigned the following areas, whereby manifestations in 
the verbal area are somewhat more exactly differentiated:
1. Physiological manifestations (e.g.. trembling, paling).
2. Nonvocal nonverbal manifestations (e.g.. mimic, gesturing, body 
attitude).
3. Vocal nonverbal manifestations (e.g., affect sounds, laughter, groaning).
4. Paralinguistics (e.g.. voice characteristics, speech rate).
5. Verbal proportion of utterances
5.1. Manifestation in the linguistic-content form of the verbalization (e.g.
word selection).
5.2. Content-thematic adjustment of the verbalization
5.2.1. Emotional-verbal utterances e.g. proclaims.
5.2.2. Verbal-emotional utterances e.g. reproaches, disciplining.
5.2.3. Verbal labeling / description of experience-relevant 
events/circumstances
5.2.4. Description/narration of the situational circumstances of an 
experience
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5.3. Verbal thematization of experience
5.3.1. Verbal labeling of experience
5.3.2. Description of experience
6. Conversational behavior
6.1. Topic (e.g., selection of a sad topic).
6.2. Type of conversation (e.g., silly jokes).
6.3. Conversational strategies (e.g., demonstrative denial, shameless 
openness).
6.4. Organization of conversation (e.g., overlap, interruption).
6.5. Conversation modality (e.g., engaged, loosely, ironically).
This system shows how broad the spectrum of the phenomena is by which 
emotions can be manifested. They distribute themselves over the entire spectrum 
of communicative behavior.
Interpretation of Experiences and Emotions
Interacting individuals interpret others’ experiences and emotions all the time, 
although with changing intensity and accuracy. The interpretation consists of the 
fact that (a) specific experiencing is imputed to the other person—also 
independent of indicators present, that (b) behaviors and physiological reactions 
are interpreted as emotion expression, and that (c) experience thematization is 
interpreted. The ascription of an emotion is a result of these three components.
In the majority of situations, experience is imputed more or less 
differentially to the interaction partner. Even when no emotional indicators are 
present or perceived, emotions can be imputed to others on the basis of (a) the 
emotion rules that apply to the specific situation, (2) the projection of one’s 
own emotional disposition on the other, and (3) potentially, knowledge about 
one’s partner’s emotional disposition.
During an interaction, a partner’s behaviors and physiological reactions may 
be interpreted as an expression of his or her experience and emotions. When 
other’s reactions are interpreted in such a way, I call them experience and 
emotion indicators. For the interpreting person, they are indicators of certain 
emotions within the situation concerned, but they are not indicators in a general 
and objective way. In principle, all of one’s partner’s behaviors and 
physiological reactions can serve as possible forms of an expression of 
experience and emotions and thus used to interpret their emotional state.
Finally, the interpretation of experiencing also supports itself by the 
interpretation of the experience thematization of the other person.
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Processing of Experiences and Emotions
Once experiences and emotions are established as common fact for the 
participants by manifestation and interpretation, they can be handled or processed 
in the interaction. We can distinguish analytically among four processing 
strategies: (a) “entering” refers to all strategies with which the interaction partner 
accepts Ihc displayed emotion as appropriate and handles it with expressions of 
sympathy; (b) “analyzing” refers to strategies by which the suitability of the 
manifested emotion in terms of intensity and/or type is problematized; (c) 
“calling into question” refers to strategies by which displayed emotions are not 
accepted as appropriate; and finally (d) “ignoring” refers to strategies by which 
the interaction partner—despite having perceived and interpreted the 
emotion—consciously and obviously avoids acknowledging it and dealing with 
it interactively in manifest way. The demonstrative character of the avoidance 
process differentiates between “ignoring” and “passing over.” These four 
strategies can also occur in combination. It is obvious that the three first 
strategies mentioned are tied to verbal communication processes.
A range of possibilities of the interactive handling of emotions has developed 
into communicative patterns of action. Patterns of action are socially 
standardized and conventionalized practices that serve to realize specific functions 
and purposes that frequently return during social processes (Ehlich & Rehbein, 
1986). So, for example, a “sympathy-pattern” is central to the “entering” 
strategy (Fiehler, 1990a, pp. 150-156), whereas a “divergence” pattern of 
action—with which a manifested emotion becomes an object of negotiation—is 
central to “analyzing” and “calling into question.” I illustrate the divergence- 
pattern by a (fictitious) example:
A: C could have saved himself his silly remarks!
B: Don’t be so annoyed at yourself. It isn’t worth it.
A: Let me, anyway. I want to excite myself at times.
In this example, an emotion expressed by A is called into question by B. B 
interprets A’s expressive phenomena (e.g. word selection, intonation) as 
annoyance. B’s suggestion in the context of the negotiation that starts with his 
utterance is directed toward a modification of the intensity of experience (“so”). 
The suggestion for the modification of the experience is implemented in the 
form of a direct request. The reason recurs due to an emotion rule, according to 
which a high intensity of experience is coupled to a high importance of the 
event, which does not exist in B’s opinion. The correcting function of the 
suggestion is predominant. B’s attempt to interactively regulate emotion is 
rejected by A, however, who then uses another experience label (“excite”).
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This example illustrates that emotions can very probably be “negotiated” and 
that this negotiation can concern not only the manifestations but also the 
emotions themselves. Such negotiations are delivered on the basis of implicit or 
explicit mentioned emotion rules. Feelings are thereby argued on the basis of 
conceptions about emotions such as whether they are appropriate or 
inappropriate, justified or unjustified, and so forth. Negotiations of this type 
make it clear that feelings are by far not a private thing but are socially 
standardized.
CONNECTIONS BETWEEN EMOTIONS AND 
COMMUNICATION BEHAVIOR
Thus far, we have considered the tasks that take place during the handling of 
emotions in interaction from a process perspective—that is, from the point of 
view of the interacting partners—with particular focus on how partners solve 
emotions tasks in and through communicative processes. Now, we will take an 
“interactional analysis” perspective—the perspective of a person analyzing a 
previously documented interaction—and consider what phenomena in the 
conversation can be used to detect that emotions were manifested, interpreted, and 
processed by the participants. Phenomena which appear from a process 
perspective to be, for example, manifestations of an emotional experience, will 
appear from an interactional analysis perspective, if it considers the results of an 
action, as the effects of the emotional experience on the utterances, or, more 
generally, on communicative acting. The emotional experience affects and 
modifies the communicative action and is thus evidenced there.
Connected with this idea is the question regarding fundamental systematic 
connections between emotions and communication behavior. Two such general 
connections can be identified: First, emotions modify a communicative behavior. 
Here, we can distinguish between cases in which an emotion accompanies a 
communication behavior (which would have taken place without the presence of 
the emotion) and affects the form of the message, and cases in which the 
emotion motivates a communicative behavior and thus is the cause for the 
utterances, which would not have taken place in such a way without it. Second, 
communicative behavior modifies emotions. In this second connection, we can 
further distinguish between cases in which the communication behavior 
influences one's own emotionality and cs'.-“-. in which it influences the 
emotionality of the interlocutor!s). In the first case, verbal techniques of personal 
emotion regularization are involved.
Three basic assumptions are prerequisites for these considerations of different 
connections between emotional and communicative behavior. They are explicitly 
identified here because they are not unproblematic and are not necessarily shared
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(even though they are constitutive for the common understanding of the 
connections between emotions and communication; cf. Fiehler. 1990a, pp. 163- 
167 for the problems of these assumptions):
• Emotional experience and communicative behavior can be understood as 
entities that are, in principle, independent from each other.
• The first assumption implies that emotions can be the cause or the 
reason for communicative activities, and also, in contrast, that 
communicative behavior can be a cause and reason for emotions.
• The third assumption means that there can be an unemotional or 
emotionally neutral mode of communicative activities and that this is 
the basic mode. If emotions occur, then they modify this neutral way of 
communication in a recognizable and specific way. According to this 
view, communicative processes are built up from unemotional (neutral, 
objective, calm) passages and emotional phases, in which the 
communicative behavior is affected and modified more or less strongly 
by emotions.
If one asks where in communication behavior emotions work themselves out 
or to which phenomena must one pay attention, one can orient oneself to the 
manifestation areas specified above. In each of these areas, phenomena can be 
identified that are brought into connection conventionally with the working of 
emotions and by the presence of which it can be considered that with their 
causation, emotions were in play or that they are indicators for emotions (cf. 
Fiehler 1990a, pp. 168-174).
METHODOLOGY OF EMOTION ANALYSIS
Insofar as it is interested in the interdependencies between communication and 
emotions, the analysis of conversation involves examining these connections in 
conversation recordings and transcripts. The general questions of such an 
emotion analysis are: (a) Which processes of manifestation, interpretation, and 
processing of emotional experience can be found in a conversation? and (b) How 
are these processes presented in the participants’ communication behavior? 
Because it is not evident during recordings of natural conversations whether and 
which emotions play a role there, and emotionality usually only is thematized to 
the smallest extent, an explicit methodology of emotion analysis is of central 
importance for such investigations. In the following, a six-step methodology is 
sketched out that makes it possible to ask the questions mentioned, at least to 
some extent.
The first step of the emotion analysis consists of determining what is 
thematized in emotions and emotion interpretations in the participants’ 
interaction. Indicators for thematization include explicit experience labels and
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descriptions. On the basis of this thematization, one can examine whether 
specific emotion indicators corresponding to these thematizations can be 
recognized.
The target of the second step is to realize, on the basis of empathy, which 
emotions and which experiences can play a role for the participants in an 
interaction of the type concerned and in the specific situation. This step makes 
the scope o f expected experience of the participants explicit on the basis of 
emotion rules.
In the third step, the interaction is examined for indicators by which 
emotions and emotion interpretations express themselves. So that this step does 
not go over the line, it is limited first to sequences of the interaction that are 
particularly “emotional.”
In the fourth step, the selected sequences are examined utterance by utterance 
in view of both of the types of systematic connections between emotions and 
communicative behavior previously specified. That is, it is now sequentially 
examined as to whether and how the imputed emotions modify the participants’ 
communicative behavior and whether and how this communicative behavior 
modifies the participants’ emotional states.
In the fifth  step, the analysis, which in the third and fourth steps focused 
only on selected sequences, is expanded to the entire interaction.
The sixth and last step of the analysis pursues another direction. It examines 
whether communicative patterns of emotion processing can be found in the 
interaction (e.g., the sympathy pattern, the divergence pattern). This analysis 
step can also be executed independently of the others.
EMOTIONALITY IN SPECIFIC CONVERSATION TYPES
In the following, I concentrate on investigations that examine emotionality in 
natural conversations on a interpretive and conversation analytic basis.
It is obvious that attention was directed first toward such conversation types, 
which according to the everyday understanding are “emotionally pregnant,” 
particularly disputes or therapeutic communication. On the basis of authentic 
conversations and transcripts, very different investigation questions are possible. 
On the one hand, in the sense of a case analysis, the reconstruction of the 
emotionality of a single conversation can be the aim, on the other hand, 
systematically limited questions can be processed:
• Incidents and processing of a certain experience or a certain emotion 
(e.g., embarrassment [after errors in instuctions; BrUnner, 1987J, 
feelings of indebtedness [Vangelisti, Daly, & Rudnick, 1991],
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astonishment [Selting, 1995], rage [Christmann & Gunthner, 1996], 
indignation [Schwitalla, 1996], edginess [Hartung, 1996])
• Incidents of specific means or forms of the manifestation (e.g., 
exaltation [Kallmeyer, 1979a], emphasis [Selting, 1994], interjections 
and reduplications [Drescher, 1997]).
• Incidents of specific communicative patterns and forms of emotion 
processing (e.g., sympathy pattern [Fiehler, 1990a; Schwitalla, 1991], 
tone of appeasement [Schwitalla, 1997]).
•  Specifics of the manifestation, interpretation and processing of 
emotionality in a certain type of conversation, and so on.
Among the particularly emotionally pregnant conversation types are 
conversations between physician arid, patient (cf. Bliesener, 1982; Bliesener & 
Kohle, 1986; Fiehler, 1990b; Gaus Sc Kohle, 1982; Lalouschek, 1993; Loning, 
1993; Lorcher, 1983). This type of conversation is characterized by a special 
problematic concerning the manifestation of experiences and emotions by the 
patient. Although diseases are frequently connected with intense experience, the 
somatically oriented medical field expects the patient to keep his or her emotions 
out of the situation and to limit his or her participation to cooperatively and 
materially supporting the physician’s anamnestic, diagnostic, and therapeutic 
measures. This frequently succeeds only partially with the patients, however, so 
that a processing of the manifested emotions then becomes necessary within the 
physician-patient conversation. This emotional processing often ends 
unsatisfactorily.
Physicians or medical personnel frequently carry out “feeling work” (Strauss, 
Fagerhaugh, Suezek, & Wiener, 1980) during the treatment as a purely 
instrumental function to ease their own work. “Feeling work” refers to dealing 
with a thematized or anticipated experience of the patient “in the service of the 
main work process” (Strauss et al„ 1980, p. 629).
Therapy conversations are also emotionally intensive in a special way (e.g., 
Coulter, 1979; Fiehler, 1990a, pp. 239-247; Kiisermann, 1995). One of the 
central goals in such interactions as client-centered therapy is the verbalization o f  
the contents o f emotional experience. Accordingly, processes of thematization, 
interpretation, and processing of experience and emotions play a substantial role 
in therapeutic conversations of this type; The purpose of the therapy sessions is 
to bring the client’s emotions into focus. On the one hand, the client’s emotions 
connected with the current therapy situation are processed. On the other hand, the 
client’s past experiences are brought into the therapy situation by narrations and 
reports. The client's manifestations and thematization of experiences in client- 
ccntcrcd therapy differ quantitatively but not qualitatively from those in other 
conversation types. They are much more frequent and are more developed and 
differentiated (e.g., complex experience thematization, experience declarative
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formulas with developed comparisons), and thematizations are over-represented in 
comparison with the expression of emotions (cf. the following analysis). 
Qualitative differences, however, exist in the interpretation of experience 
manifestations (by the therapists) and in the processing of manifested experiences 
(by client and therapist).
One of the therapist’s central actions is to redirect attention away from the 
client’s reports, narrations, and reflections, to the experience dimension of the 
reported events. For this, the therapist’s most important tools are the focusing 
and interpretation of experience. During experience focusing the therapist does 
not formulate interpretation, but rather motivates the patient to explore and 
verbalize his or her experience . In addition, the therapist can formulate an 
experience interpretation more specifically by using a label or description with a 
hypothetical or determining character. With such experience interpretations three 
things can occur: they can be ignored, the client can make them his or her own, 
or they can become an article of a negotiation. The experience negotiation can 
thereby refer to both the intensity and type of experience imputed by the 
therapist. These differences regarding manifestation, interpretation, and 
processing of experience and emotions are a direct reflection of the therapeutic 
theory, which is made operational in the conversation with the client.
A third type of emotionally pregnant communication is disputes (Fiehler 
1986, 1990a; Kallmeyer, 1979b). If different views, opinions, and interests 
meet, if a diversity of opinion, a controversy, or a conflict is present, then, for 
the participants, this is frequently connected with emotions, which manifest 
themselves in the interaction. However, usually the experience of the 
participants is not the topic of the interaction but rather is manifested by 
expression parallel to the argument about another topic. A prerequisite for 
conflicts is that a contrast exists so that a position and an opposite standpoint 
are interactively built up and negotiated. This can cover a pair of utterances or 
long interaction sequences. The existence of an opposition means that the 
positions are mutually evaluated as not compatible or contradictory and that on 
the basis of these evaluations, the opposite standpoint is formulated. In this 
manner, each contribution for delivering of oppositions contains components o f 
evaluation. This is essential for understanding the role of emotions in the 
delivery of oppositions: A part of these evaluations is communicated by the 
expression of emotions .
A final example of emotionally intensive communicative activities are 
narrations (e.g., Bloch, 1996; Fiehler, 1990a; Giinthner, 1997). The cause for 
many narrations is that a person has felt particularly strong emotions or has had 
unusual experiences that were associated with intense emotions. The purpose of 
the narrations is to clarify these experiences or emotions for another person. This
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clarification typically takes place in narrations less by means of experience labels 
or descriptions, but more by description of the situational circumstances and the 
flow of the events whereby the emotions concerned can and must be inferred on 
the basis of emotion rules.
This short overview shows that the empirical analysis of emotionality in 
natural conversations is still in its beginning.
EXAMPLE ANALYSIS
To illustrate the statements regarding therapy conversations in the previous 
paragraph and to show that empirical data can be analyzed by means of the 
conceptual instruments presented here, I now examine two short exemplary 
transcriptions from therapeutic sessions. The following transcription originates 
from the initial phase of such a session. At the beginning of a session, it is 
typical for clients to report events relevant to experience from the period between 
the sessions. This also occurs here. The transcription is segmented with indicated 
lines, so that the analysis can be followed more easily.
(1) Giving and taking 10: Transcript Section 1,1-20 
Transcript name: Giving and taking 10
Type of interaction: Conversational psychotherapy (10th session)
Interacting persons: K: Client (female), B: Therapist (male)
Audio recording: B; open
Transcription: R. Weingarten ,
Transcription system: Kallmeyer & Schütze^ [c c  k  o t  Appi2i\(J. [X. c l )
1, 1 K ...m ir gings-,die ganze Woche-, also ich hab die Woche über
How the whole week went for me? Then 1 have to think the week over
1 2
2 B
3 K nich mehr-,so furchtbare Stimmungsschwankungen gehabt ne’
Never before, never had such terrible mood swings
4 B
5 K so-,.ging mir eher-,äh bescheiden. ..._(langsam ) stimmungs-
so granted, I have rather, um, tendency
3 _4
6 B mhm
7 K mäßig + ...ähm ...ja,w as jetz so akut grade war’ gestern hat




9 K mich mein Freund angerufen- _das war doch n ziemlicher
my friend calling me? That was nevertheless a considerable
_6
10 B Mhm
11 K Schlag vors Kontor wieder’ weil ich hatte das Gefühl-
Shot across the kidneys again ‘ because I had the feeling
_7
12 B mhm _hat dich
mhm you had
_8
13 K ich weiß es nich,hinter-
I didn’t know it, behind
14 B irgendwie mitg-,mitgenommen schon.
somehow it had happened already.
15 K her ich hab mich selbst so-,einerscits ha-,hats mich nich
A while ago, on the one hand hectar, hadn’t
16 B
17 K so ausn Schuhen geschmissen wie ich dachte ne’ so-_




19 K aber- ja’
however
20 B dir so- .wirklich so vo- (k) schlimmer vorgestellt, denn
because you had so, really made out so badly (k ) .
The transcript shows a complex experience thematization, which also covers 
a report of a past situation. With this complex experience thematization, the 
client brings a past experience into the therapy situation, where it is then 
processed by therapist and client in specific ways.
In segment 1 [... I felt-, the whole week-], the client begins with the 
experience declarative formula “mir gings” (I felt). As segment 2 shows [well I 
didn”t have such terrible mood swings all week], a recapitulatory description of 
the experience is to be given. This is implemented in segment 2 by a negatively 
defined experience label “nicht mehr so furchtbare Stimmungsschwankungen” 
(not such terrible mood swings). In segment 3 [so-.. I felt more-, mhm 
moderately], experience is formulated positively, now again with an experience 
declarative formula and a short comparison. I characterize this as a short 
comparison, because in my opinion “bescheiden” (moderately) does not represent
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a conventional experience label. Segment 4 [(slowly) concerning mood], which 
is related to 3, shows and clarifies retroactively that this was meant as experience 
thematization. This elucidation may be connected with the fact that the 
suitability of “bescheiden” (moderately) for thematization of the experience 
appears questionable to K. Segment 5 involves the thematization of an 
experience by designation of an experience-relevant event: “gestern hat mich 
mein Freund angerufen” (yesterday my friend called me). From what follows, it 
becomes clear that this concerns the ex-friend. For all participants it is evident, 
and this also is supported by the introduction “was jetzt so akut grade war” (what 
just now was so acutely) that this event must have been connected with an 
intensive experience for K. The event is identified to thematize the concerning 
experience. Even if this experience had not been more exactly specified in the 
following utterances by means of other practices, B could have inferred it on the 
basis of emotion rules from the designated event. Segment 6 is then a 
description of the experience [that was still a considerable shot across the kidneys 
again]. Together with segment 5 and segment 7 [because I had the feeling-] K 
here supplies a complex experience thematization. The description of the 
experience in 6, which is carried out with a fixed figurative-metaphorical idiom, 
above all focuses the aspects of the intensity (considerable), the dynamics of the 
experience concerned (suddenness: “shot”) and probably the type of experience.
It is notable that the client uses the figure of speech “shot across the 
kidneys.” This German idiom is usually phrased “a shot to the kidneys.” We can 
speculate that this is a confounding of two idiomatic phrases: “shot to the 
kidneys” and “shot across the bow.” However these speculations transcend what 
should be demonstrated here. If something meaningful lies behind this slip of the 
tongue, it is of more concern to the therapist or analyst than to the linguist. In 
segment 7, the client sets up a reason for the intensity and dynamics of the 
experience described, which is initiated with an experience declarative formula 
“ich hatte das Gefühl” (I had the feeling). Now however in segment 8 B 
intervenes with a determining experience interpretation “hat dich irgendwie 
mitgenommen schon” (still stirred you anyhow). This is a typical 
communicative activity of therapists in client-centered therapy. There are several 
conceivable explanations for this intervention: The therapist can be of the 
opinion that the client has not thematized the experience clearly enough with the 
figurative description, or that it does not focus the relevant aspects of the 
experience. B focuses the consequences of the experience in his intervention. 
Last but not least, it is also conceivable that B only wants to paraphrase the 
description of the experience to ensure his understanding.
K understands the intervention as a focusing of possible consequences of the 
experience and rejects the imputed consequences: “einerseits hats mich nich so
102
ausn Schuhen geschmissen wie ich dachte” (on the one hand it didn’t knock me 
out of my socks in the way I thought it would). This figure of speech clearly 
focuses the possible consequences of the experience, whereby the whole utterance 
represents a statement regarding the unexpectedly small intensity of the 
experience. Again B intervenes with an utterance, which conceives the intensity 
verbal designative: “hattest dir schlimmer vorgestellt” (you thought it would be 
worse). This may throw a light on the intention of the first intervention 
retroactively. Under the circumstances, B would like to reflect back the figurative 
descriptions of the experience to K in the form of verbal labels. A resort to 
socially preformed and standardized verbal labels surely creates clarity for K with 
the interpretation of his emotional life. However, this use remains to be weighed 
against the plasticity and intensity of figurative descriptions of the experience.
The first transcription emphasized the manner in which the client brings her 
experience into the therapeutic conversation. In the next example, we focus on a 
typical activity of the therapist: the experience focusing already mentioned. In 
this example, it leads to a developed experience exploration of the client.
(II) Marriage problem 1, Transcript Section 23,35 - 24,18 
Transcript name: Marriage problem 1
Type of interaction: Conversational psychotherapy (1st session)
Interacting persons: K: Client (male), B: Therapist (male)
Audio recording: B; open
Transcription: R. Weingarten .
Transcription system: Kallmeyer & Schütze f ^ ^ r  | 0 o ^  ^ p p C i4 c h \( l / ) )
23,35 K daß da n Verhältnis is.
that there is a relationship.
36 B äh.wär das für Sig irgendwie (&) wenn
Um, if that was so for you somehow (&) if
37 K
38 B Ihre Frau das denken würde oder sie denkt ja,+ em-,was emp-
Your wife would think that or she thinks yeah, + em, what fee-
39 K ... (leise) was emp-
...(quietly) which fee-
40 B finden Sic dabei daß Ihre Frau das denkt.
Do you lind that your wile thinks that.
24, 1 K findich dabei + ...ich  fühl mich jaan undfürsich ziemlich
I think... I feel quite the same for myself and her
2 B
3 K unwohl dabei. ..(holt Luft)
unwell with it. (draws a breath)
4 B ähä,(leise) was is das dann füm Gefühl +
aha, (quietly) what kind of a feeling is that then?
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5 K wie soll ich das erklären,(sehr leise) es is n Gefühl- (7 Sek.
Like 1 say, (very quiet) it is a feeling-(7 sec..
6 B
7 K (Pause) Ija  ich,+ also auf jeden Fall in mir dieses Unwohl-
(Break) Yeah, I, in any case there is this sick feeling in me.
8 B
9 K sein, (h) äh is vorhanden äh
its. (h) urn is available urn
10 B ähä is da son Stück schlechtes Ge-
Uh huh, you have a bad conscience about it.
11 K ja,könnt ich (k) könnte man wohl sagen (sehr
yes, can I (k) one could probably say (very much)
12 B wissen dran’, so daß
know something about it, so that
13 K (leise) das is sone Art- es is ne Art + schlech-
(quietly) There is some type ...it is a type + bad
14 B daß man eigentlich sowas nicht lut,oder was
that one actually does not do something like that, or which
15 K tes Gewissen schon dabei, aber das Gros is glaub ich noch was
bad conscience already. However 1 still believe most of it
16 B ja
yes
17 K anderes. (8 Sek. Pause) ich mache mir ja auch-,äh so Gedanken
other one. (8 sec. break) I also, um, have thoughts like this.
18 B Ähä
uh-huh
K takes the perspective of his wife in a problem description and sees the 
authorization for her suspicions that he has a relation with another woman. 
Thereupon B changes the perspective and focuses K’s experience with the 
question: “was empfinden Sie dabei daß Ihre Frau das denkt” (what do you feel 
that your wife thinks that) (23.38-40). K repeats the question for himself and 
begins an experience exploration. He describes his experience with an 
experiential declarative formula “ich fühl mich” (I feel) (24,1) and the label 
“unwohl” (unwell) (24,3). Thereupon B requires a further specification “was is 
das dann füm Gefühl” (what kind of a feeling is it) (24,4). B thematizes his 
difficulties during the description formulaically and repeats it (24,5-9). That is, 
he is not capable of a specification here. Now B continues with an designative 
projective experience interpretation: “is da son Stück schlechtes Gewissen dran” 
(you have a bad conscience about it) (24,10-12). B agrees with that, hesitating, 
but then determines: “aber das Gros is glaub ich noch was anderes” (however the 
essential I believe is something else) (24,15-'•!). This is not executed however,
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but after a break K changes to a new topic, with which he leaves the level of 
focusing on the experience, without B insisting.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The attempt to understand emotionality from a decidedly interactive and social 
perspective is not only the prerequisite for making it accessible for a linguistic 
and conversation analytic handling but helps also to release emotions from a 
tendency to reify them as natural phenomena and “strange powers.” They become 
recognizable as quantities that can be shaped and influenced communicatively and 
as resources in the process of interaction.
Likewise it becomes clear that they are not a purpose in themselves. 
Manifestation, interpretation, and processing of emotions always take place in 
larger frames for superordinate purposes. Emotions are manifested, interpreted, 
and processed in order to comfort someone, to solve problems, to carry out a 
conflict, to have fun together, to give therapy to a person, and there may be still 
other purposes. Communication processes related to feelings are embedded 
functionally in more global social practices. Apart from extensive analyses of 
emotions in different natural conversations, the explication of these frames 
belongs among the pending research tasks.
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(I) Giving and taking 10: Transcript Section 1, 1-20
Transcript name: Giving and taking 10
Type of interaction: Conversational psychotherapy (10th session) 
Interacting persons: K: Client (female), B: Therapist (male) 
Audio recording: B; open 
Transcription: R. Weingarten 
Transcription system: Kallmeyer & Schutze
1, 1 K: 
2 B:
I..-mir gings-,die ganze Woche-,lalso ich hab die Woche über
I1 I2
. . . I  f e l t - , t h e  whole  w e e k - ,  w e l l  I  d i d n ' t  h ave  such
3 K: nich mehr-,so furchtbare Stimmungsschwankungen gehabt ne'
4 B:
t e r r i b l e  mood Swings a l l  week
5 K:
6 B:
I so-..ging mir eher-,äh bescheiden. ... I (langsam) stimmungs- 
13 mhm 14
S O - . . I  f e l t  m o r e - ,  um m o d e r a te l y  ( s lo w ly )  c o n c e r n in g
mhm
7 K: mäßig + I...ähm...ja,was jetz so akut grade war' gestern hat
8 B: 15
mood + . . . u m . . .  y e s , w h a t  j u s t  now was so  a c u t e l y ’ y e s t e r d a y
9 K: mich mein Freund angerufen- Idas war doch n ziemlicher
10 B: mhm|6
my b o y f r i e n d  c a l l e d  me-  t h a t  was s t i l l  a c o n s i d e r a b l e
mhm











Schlag vors Kontor wieder' Iweil ich hatte das Gefühl-
mhml 7 |hat dich
e
s h o t  a c r o s s  th e  k i d n e y s  a g a i n ' b e c a u s e  I  had th e  f e e l i n g -
mhm s t i l l
ich weiß es nich,hinter-
irgendwie mitg-,mitgenommen schon.
I  d o n ' t  know, a f t e r w a r d s
s t i r r e d  you anyhow
her ich hab mich selbst so-,einerseits ha-,hats mich nich 
J a sk e d  m y s e l f o n  th e  one hand i t  d i d n ' t  knock
so ausn Schuhen geschmissen wie ich dachte ne' so-





dir so- ,wirklich so vo- (k) schlimmer vorgestellt.
b u t -  y e s '
you th o u g h t  i t  would b e  w o r s e .
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(II) Marriage problem 1, Transcript Section 23,35 - 24,18 
Transcript name: Marriage problem 1
Type o f interaction: Conversational psychotherapy (1st session)
Interacting persons: K: Client (male), B: Therapist (male)
Audio recording: B; open 
Transcription: R. Weingarten 
Transcription system: Kallmeyer& Schütze
23 , 3 b K: dull da u Verhältnis is.
36 B: äh,war das für Sie irgendwie (&) wenn
that t h e r e  i s  a r e l a t i o n s h i p .
urn, how would t h a t  b e  f o r  you  i f
37 K:
38 B: Ihre Frau das denken würde oder sie denkt ja,+ em-,was emp-
your w i f e  would t h in k  t h a t  o r  sh e  t h i n k s  y e a h ,+  f e e - , what do
39 K:
40 B: finden Sie dabei daß Ihre Frau das denkt.
(leise) was emp-
( q u i e t l y )  what do
you f e e l  t h a t  y o u r  w i f e  th i n k s  t h a t  way.
24, 1 K: find ich dabei + ...ich fühl mich ja an und für sich ziemlich
2 B:
I feel + . . . a l l  in all I f e e l  r a t h e r  unwell
3 K: unwohl dabei.
4 B:
..(holt Luft)
ähä,(leise) was is das dann fürn Gefühl +
. . (draws a b r e a th )
uh huh, ( q u i e t l y )  what k i n d  o f  a f e e l i n g  i s  i t  +
















K: wie soll ich das erklären,(sehr leise) es is n Gefühl- (7 Sek.
B:
how can I  e x p l a i n ,  ( v e r y  q u i e t l y )  i t  i s  a f e e l i n g -  (7 s e c .
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K: Pause) tja ich,+ also auf jeden Fall in mir dieses Unwohl-
B:
bre a k )  yeah  I , +  in any c a s e  t h e r e  i s  t h i s  s i c k  f e e l i n g  i n
K: sein. (h) äh is« vorhanden äh
B: ähä is da son Stück schlechtes Ge-
rne. (h) urn i s  a v a i l a b l e  urn
uh huh i s  t h e r e  a b i t  o f  b a d  c o n s c i e n c e
K: ja,könnt ich (k) könnte man wohl sagen (sehr
B: wissen dran',so daß
yes,J c o u ld  (k) you c o u ld  s a y  t h a t  ( v e r y  
w i th it',so t h a t
K: leise) das is sone Art- es is ne Art + schlech-
B: daß man eigentlich sowas nicht tut,oder was
q u i e t l y )  t h a t  i s  a k i n d -  i t  i s  a k i n d  o f  + bad
t h a t  one s h o u l d n ' t  r e a l l y  do so m e th in g  l i k e  t h a t , o r  what
K: tes Gewissen schon dabei. aber das Gros is glaub ich noch was
B: ja
c o n s c i e n c e  a l r e a d y .  b u t  th e  e s s e n t i a l  I  b e l i e v e  i s  some-
y e s
K: anderes. (8 Sek. Pause) ich mache mir ja auch-,äh so Gedanken
B: ähä
t h i n g  e l s e  (8 s e c .  b re a k )  I  a l s o  h a v e - ,  um th o u g h t s  l i k e  t h i s  
uh-huh
